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ABSTRACT
This thesis proposes to develop a clear understanding of which
financing tools are and can be used in order to enhance success in real estate
development in Venezuela. In recent years, the country has witnessed a rise
in inflation rates accompanied by high and volatile interest rates. These two
factors have had a great impact on the economy but have especially made its
mark on the housing market.
Through a macroeconomic study of Venezuela's situation and in
particular the construction industry, we realize the importance in studying
the relationship among financing and construction. By examining a variety
of possible modifications of traditional mortgages to assess the effectiveness of
alternative designs, which will lower current interest rates available to
developers and make housing more affordable to buyers. The instruments
involved in housing finance studied are: pre-sales, graduate payment
mortgages, newly issued housing bonds which represent the introduction of a
secondary market for real estate financing, and finally the effects of financing
through dollar-based bonds. In this paper I explain how each of these tools
are implemented by the construction industry and how they contribute to
housing development.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis analyzes the different financing mechanisms used in the
Venezuela real estate market today, studies possible alternative solutions to
lower interest rates available to developers and make housing more
affordable to purchasers, to make construction more attractive to developers
and less risky to lenders. Through a macroeconomic analysis of Venezuela
and its construction industry this paper explores the importance of studying
relationships between financing and construction, and among the buyers,
developers, and the lending agents all of whom greatly affect one another.
In seeking financing, the real estate industry's principal goals are:
* To create the highest property value.
* To provide the best market terms.
* To provide the greatest value to the buyer.
* To increase property market potential by expanding the
marketplace.
* To lower developers risk, and enable them to raise
funds at the lowest possible cost.
These ideas will be carried through this paper when analyzing the
different financial tools. The structure of the thesis consists in a Preamble to
Macroeconomics and Finances in Venezuela in the first chapter, followed by a
study in the second chapter of the demographics and financing effects of this
situation on the multifamily housing market. This analysis will help us to
understand both, the market's specificity and its differences for each income
group in Venezuela. Chapter 3, describes how real estate industry functions
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in Venezuela, and analyze the impact of inflation and high interest rates on
the construction industry. Chapters 5 through 7 explore in detail specific
financial methods applied to the housing market, such as pre-sales (chapter 5)
which is the method most often implemented by developers to finance high-
and middle-income housing projects. Chapter 6 studies the graduated
payment mortgage, a mechanism developed by savings and loans to help
middle-income families buy houses in a hyper- inflationary economy.
Chapter 7 analyzes the first bond issuance in Venezuela which will
provide developers with a more sophisticated mechanism to raise money,
than pre-sales, construction loans or partnerships. And finally, this paper
specially analyzes the possibility of real estate financed in dollars, and the
risks involved. The methodology implemented for this study included in-
depth interviews with financial investors, executive mortgage lenders, and
developers in Venezuela.
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MACROECONOMICS AND FINANCIAL
ENVIRONMENT OF VENEZUELA
The current macroeconomical environment in Venezuela evidences
great uncertainty as to what direction it will take in the future. Although
the situation has shown some signs of improvement, disequilibrium in the
monetary and fiscal areas threaten the economic stability of the country.
Three factors are critical to understanding the current economic
disequilibrium confronting Venezuela: the seemingly irreducible path
toward high levels of inflation which have already reached levels of close
40% in 1993., the continual tendency toward currency devaluation which is
estimated this year at 33% (Bolivares vs. Dollars), and the strong pressure of
high interest rates which have already risen to over 55%o to prevent capital
flight from the country. These factors directly influence the monetary and
financial stability of the country in an adverse manner and limit the ability of
national industries to function well. To understand more fully the current
situation in Venezuela, it is useful to review briefly its past economic
performance.
During the late 1980s, despite a major government deficit and strong
negative interest rates, the economy of Venezuela, after many years of
stagnancy and recession, again began to grow. Still, the deficit in the public
sector came to 10% of the gross national product in 1989. This means that the
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government spent in excess of its earnings an equivalent of one-tenth of the
total output created by Venezuelan economy.
Because of the public expenditures and lack of monetary policies, the
economy grew and demand expanded. This demand increased imports, and
the need for foreign currency which, without generating new exports, was
taken from The Foreign Exchange Reserves of Venezuela. Therefore, the
economic growth, based on intensive government spending, resulted in
currency devaluation and deterioration in the foreign reserves of Venezuela.
Ultimately, these factors produced limitations on national production because
of foreign exchange constraints. This combination of expanded demand and
limited production, resulted in very high levels of inflation, to approximately
80% annually during the late 1980s. Growth produced in such manner was
untenable because there were not enough national reserves to sustain it for a
prolonged period of time. Rather, this growth had to be adjusted by a macro-
economic program.
In 1989, a program for economic adjustment was introduced aimed at
controlling inflation and liberalizing the economy. But its implementation
generated a major recession and economical contraction.l This program
focused initially on reducing the fiscal deficit, deregulating prices, currency
exchange and interest rates. The principal elements of this economic reform
included establishing a unified, market-determined exchange rate,
privatization of many public industries, and significant liberalization of
international trade by reductions of import tariffs and trade controls. There
1Such a program was implemented by Alan Garzia in Peru and is credited with
producing the collapse of its economy and, among other things, the Fujimori
phenomenon.
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seemed to be no way to try to achieve a healthy economy, without incurring a
strong recession. This recession was followed by strong inflation, caused by
devaluation and the release of many prices which had been frozen for years.
The tough fiscal and monetary policy managed to stabilize the
economy by lowering the inflation rate and reducing public expenditures, but
brought with it very high interest rates and lower exchange rates that still
have not been controlled. The decline in Venezuelan oil revenues as a
result of a fall in oil prices in 1980s, put further pressure on the Venezuelan's
exchange rate.
There were a number of other factors besides the government deficit
which contributed to inflation pressure of costs as: a) sectional labor activists
who demand accelerated salary and wage growth, and this influence industry
costs and price increases. b) higher production costs, especially in those
industries dependent upon importing raw materials. c) tax increases,
generally used to finance public expenditures, and establish rent transfers to
families and businesses that comprise the public sector. To alleviate these
fiscal acts, labor resorts to demanding better wages and businesses demand
higher prices. d) while increases in interest rates led to cooling of the
economy, it brought higher costs that, in turn, were transferred to the
consumer via higher consumer prices.
The reforms adopted in 1989 reduced major macroeconomic
imbalances in less than a year. However, because of this shock treatment in
1989 the GNP declined by 8.6 percent (Graph 2.), the bolivar was devaluated
from a 1988 nominal average rate of 14.5 bolivares per dollar to 34.7 in 1989
(see Graph 3), and there were significant increases in the price of raw
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materials and inflation reached 85% . But, the economy recovered in 1990.
Petroleum which is the cornerstone of the Venezuelan economy, showed
unexpected growth from oil earnings in the last quarter of 1990 and the first
quarter of 1991. The increase in oil revenues was due to The Persian Golf
War which raised oil prices sharply but temporarily. In 1990, oil sales
accounted for 13,780 million US$ GDP grew 5.3 percent in 1990 and the rate
of inflation drooped to 37%. The economic recovery continued in 1991 and
1992. GDP grew 9.2% and 7.2% respectively, and inflation declined to 31% for
both years.
According to a report published by the Banco Central de Venezuela,
the GNP decreased 2.3% during the first half of 1993 due to reduction in
internal demand caused partly by contraction in public expenses. This year
inflation is estimated to be 40% to 50%. (see Graph 2.) This rate of inflation is
generated by an excessive increase in the volume of money compared with a
marginal increase in the quantity of goods and services provided, and has
generated a deep deterioration in the value of the Bolivar. The Central Bank
of Venezuela must pay interest rates of over 55% to prevent capital flight
from the country.
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After March 1989, an Exchange Agreement 2 established a free foreign
exchange market with a single, free-floating exchange rate for all currency
operations. Only the state oil company and the Venezuelan Investment
Fund must still sell foreign currency earnings to the Central Bank of
Venezuela.
Despite lower oil prices and higher-than-expected inflation, the bolivar
has depreciated at about 30% per annum to the dollar for the last two years,
which shows a proportional increase compared to 20% devaluation rate as
over previous years. The Bolivar loses approximate 15 cents daily with the
American dollar responding to a policy of mini-devaluation's by the Central
Bank of Venezuela which is trying to maintain a stable rhythm to this
depreciation as means to avoid sudden devaluation's, ease commercial
planning and increase foreign investments in the country. (see Graph 3.)
Notwithstanding, there is a constant fear of a massive drop in the exchange
rate of the bolivar, or the creation of new exchange control policies.
2 Exchange Agreement No.1. IL&T Venezuela. 1992
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(Banco Central de Venezuela)
An evolution in interest rates moved them to real levels of active3
rates of 20 to 30 interest points and passive4 rates of 10 to 20 interest points
over inflation. (see Graph 4.) The Central Bank of Venezuela had to pay
high interest rates to maintain these resources so that they would not be
invested outside the country. However, this structure of rates, shows a
transfer of wealth from debtors to creditors who are obtaining real positive
earnings from positive interest rates.
3We understand as active interest rates for those rates which will have to be paid by a
borrower when asking for mortgage at finantial institutions.
4 we understand as passive interest rates for those paid as interest for deposits by
finantial institutions.
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As indicated in Graph 5, the differential between passive rates in
Venezuela and the United States is approximately 50%, and it is oriented
toward the compensation of the increment in the risk premium associated
with possessing Bolivares instead of dollars. The risk of maintaining an
investment in Bolivares related to dollars can be appreciated by observing the
fluctuations of the yield for Venezuela CD's as a dollar-based investment.
(see Graph 5.) This, affects all other investment with higher risks which will
have to pay higher premiums to compensate risks involved.
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Other economic indicators which shows the effects suffered by the
Venezuelans by the current situation are: Decreased purchasing power and a
sharp drop in real salaries, (see Graph 7.) which shows the impoverishment
suffered by Venezuela's population; and high unemployment rates. (see
Graph 8.) Unemployment which had increased from 7.1%o in 1988 to 8.7%o in
1989, and peaked at 10.9%o in 1990, since then it has been decreasing to a level
of 7.4% in 1993.
Graph 7. (Camara de la Construction de Venezuela)
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Nevertheless, inflationary tendencies are present in most developing
countries, (see Graph 9.) Venezuela is no exception or particular case.
Furthermore, we realize that in Latin America, countries like Uruguay, Peru,
and Ecuador are experimenting higher inflation rates than Venezuela, with
inflation rates in the range of 60% per annum, and also Brazil which
experimented inflation rates over 1,200% in 1992.
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The chronic inflation, combined with negative economic growth, has
and will continue to be the biggest challenge to Venezuelan managers in the
immediate future. In 1994, one estimate 5 indicates that active interest rates
will move in a range between 60 and 70%, and inflation will not be lower
than 45%. It was further estimated that the exchange rate for December 1994
will be between 158 and 162 Bolivares to the dollar.
5by Juan Antonio Lovera, Vice-president, Manpa, November 1993.
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Looking toward Venezuela's future economic growth, much of what
might happen will depend on the behavior of the oil market, on a genuine
increase in public and private investments and capacity of exporting
untraditional goods. All of this will, in turn, be determined by the level of
political stability maintained in the county, and the restoration of
administrative and judicial credibility.
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THE MULTIFAMILY HOUSING MARKET, DEMOGRAPHICS
AND FINANCING EFFECTS IN VENEZUELA.
The centralized perspective that for many decades characterized
Venezuela's development, created territorial agglomerations that attracted
the population to Caracas and concentrated production, political and
administrative activities in it. "While there has been a strong tendency since
1960 for manufactures to locate along Caracas, the capital continues to
accommodate a considerable proportion of Venezuela's economic activity.
In 1985, 63% of commercial bank deposits were captured in the metropolitan
area and, in 1986, 49% of industrial establishments were concentrated in the
capital region. As a result, the urban area of Caracas has expanded rapidly." 6
As in most developing cities in the world, in Caracas, those with lower
incomes usually have little opportunity to purchase a house. The reason for
this is that the housing projects in urban areas are primarily dedicated to
those with mid- and high- incomes and those with lower incomes remain
primarily in rural houses in non-controlled urban settlements without
government authorization or minimum standards of living.
The Venezuelan population is predominantly young and basically
urban ( 84% of the population lives in cities, of which more than 35% lives in
6 Alan Gilbert. 1993. In Search of a Home
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Caracas ) and 43% live in structural poverty; this percentage is vastly
increasing. In Venezuela 65% of the population lives in inadequate
conditions, approximately one-half of these people do not live even under
minimal housing standards. Monthly family income for 1992 shows that
71% of all Venezuelan families had an income lower than 30,000 Bolivares.
The average urban monthly income was around 28,575 Bs/ month, which was
on average equal to approximately 409 US.$/month, at the rate of 70
Bolivares per dollar. 7
These imbalances in concentration of population combined with low
earnings create an enormous housing deficit in the capital region, that has
begun to be addressed by the Housing Policy Law passed in 1989.
The Housing Policy Law (Ley de Politica Habitacional ) was created to
provide those with low-incomes with a mechanism which would enable
them to purchase new houses 8 by receiving a special mortgage at a very
favorable interest rate of approximately 9, compared to the actual rate, as of
this writing of 60%. Also, the law provides developers with special credits as
construction loans, also at an interest rate of 9 if the price of housing is
fixed and set according to the law. Given the very high rates of inflation of
40%, this implies a negative interest rates of around 30% as subsidies to
developers and home buyers. The cost of each unit cannot exceed the
equivalent of 180 times the standard minimum-wage, any Developer who
builds under this law by the set fix price, has the incentives of a
7E1 sector Inmobiliario de la Decada de los 90, Camara Inmobiliaria de Venezuela.
8Is important to notice that in Venezuela, no-one has built rental housing during the past
twenty years. This is the result of a lack of incentives for the sector and of the fixed
rent levels.
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Government's credits at 9% interest rate for construction for a duration of no
longer than three (3) years, after completion of construction, this loan
automatically transforms into a mortgage to finance the home buyer at the
same rate.
In order to raise funds to be provided by the law, it was set to dedicate
5% of the federal governments ordinary budget to housing, and made it
obligatory for 3% of every worker's salary to be deposited in the mortgage
bank system. This huge injection of funds was to be devoted to building
more houses for lower-income groups and reduce the housing deficit existing
in Venezuela by giving incentives to the private construction sector.
An analysis of price levels and the income of the population published
by El Consejo Nacional de la Vivienda lead to the conclusion that today more
than 60% of Venezuelan families do not have the possibility of owning a new
home, even with the help of the housing law. In the same way, the
resources of savings and loan institutions, do not show an effective response
to the necessities of this market segment and, at the same time, the
population is suffering from decreases in their purchasing power as a result of
inflation.
The savings and loan entities also have rigidly established eligibility
conditions for mortgages. For instance, S&L's require that the borrower have
sustainable earnings in order to secure a loan. Those with lower incomes,
therefore, are unable to get a loan, and with minimum existing income
requirements for loans, there are not many who would visit a financial
institution .
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In the past three years, urban multifamily housing projects under
construction in the capital area have become polarized into: luxury housing
and housing supported by La Ley de Politica Habitacional. (LPH) This
polarization has come about primarily for three reasons:
1. High cost of urban land in Caracas. This affects the
sales price in two ways: incrementing the direct costs of the
project, or increasing the initial investment on the developer's
side.
2. Increase in the cost of financing. This affects long-term
credit as well as short-term credit the for construction phase of
the project. On the other hand, it increases the risk-free factor
which the developer wants plus a premium, to realize higher
returns comparable to the risk involved.
3. Increased construction costs because of inflation, which are
translated into high sales price and reduction in the demand for
housing. (These can easily be seen in Graph 10, page )
This thesis approaches the issues related to different financing tools by
analyzing three different residential markets which have different necessities:
Luxury housing market which represents approximately (5%) of the market.
Low-income housing which the government subsidizes and now represents
approximately 80% of the market. And, middle-income housing which can
be define as the segment of the market which is not government subsidy but
does not have the resources to buy housing without financing (mainly
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conformed by salary based professionals), this group is being adversely
affected by high inflation, lack of resources, and lack of government support.
Concerning middle-income housing in Caracas, the future prospects
are not very encouraging if we analyze the cost structuring of a multifamily
project for the middle-class in Caracas. Given the economic conditions in
1992 of land, construction, and financing costs, one study 9 reveals that the
sales price can not be under 75,000 Bs/ sqm. For apartments of 100 sqm. this
represents a total cost of 7.5 millions. If we assume that the homeowner will
finance 70% of the apartment with a mortgage term of ten years and interest
rates of 30% (1992), the minimum monthly income of the potential buyer
should be Bs. 415,000, an amount which exceed the income of most middle-
class families. Average income of a middle-income family in 1992 was
approximately 200,000 Bs/ month, less than half of the required monthly
income to buy a 100 sqm apartment in Caracas.
According to the study mentioned in the previous paragraph ( shown
as case 1, Table 1), if the apartments were to be constructed outside Caracas, in
an area where land price per square meter is lower (for instance half. see
Table 1, effect of land cost), the sales price could be reduced to 5.7 million and
the minimum income of the probable buyer would be Bs. 315,000 per month.
While this is still high, it represents a 25% price reduction when compared to
similar construction in Caracas.
9Inmueble, Agosto 1992. Apartamentos para Clase Media de Venezuela.
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Table 1.
Analysis of different cost effects on middle-income
housing construction
From: Inmueble, Agosto 1992 .Apartamentos para Clase Media en Venezuela.
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Effect of Land Cost:
Concept Case 1 (lower) Case 1 Case 1 (higher)
Land (Bs.) 6,000 12,000 20,000
Interest rate 30% 30% 30%
Construction cost 24,000 24,000 24,000
Sales Price 57,000 75,000 95,000
Minimal income 315,000 415,000 525,000
Effect of the Interest Rate:
Concept Case 1 (lower) Case 1 Case 1 (higher)
Land (Bs.) 12,000 12,000 12,000
Interest rate 1 5% 20% 30%
Construction cost 24,000 24,000 24,000
Sales Price 60,000 65,000 75,000
Minimal income 200,000 265,000 415,000
Effect of Construction Cost:
Concept Case 1 (lower) Case 1 Case 1 (higher)
Land (Bs.) 12,000 12,000 12,000
Interest rate 30% 30% 30%
Construction cost 20,000 22,000 24,000
Sales Price 65,000 70,000 75,000
Minimal income 360,000 390,000 415,000
Now, if we analyze what would happen if the interest rates instead of
being at 30% annually would be reduced to 20% for the same project in
Caracas (see Table 1, effect of the interest rate), the final cost would be reduced
to 6.5 million which is a 13% reduction in price but the individuals
minimum income could only 265,000 Bs/month which is 40% less than in
the first case. Looking at this changes in rates we realize that the middle-
:income family would need a subsidy of 15% to purchase housing in Caracas.
On the other, hand if the developer would reduce construction costs
(see Table 1, effect on construction cost) by simplifying how the project is
finished (lowering quality), the price of an apartment could be reduced to 7
million (7% less) and the minimum monthly income of the purchaser could
be reduced to Bs. 390,000.
This leads to the conclusion among parameters which have caused the
disappearance of middle-income housing developments, the one which has
most influenced is the high cost of financing10 because of the effect that it has
had on expected returns of developers and the incidence in cost of long-term
financing. Second, everyday land is becoming more scare and its price is
increasing, but this does not have as much effect as interest rates on the
overall price of a project. Reduction in construction costs have not had as
great an effect on the price of apartments. Nevertheless, the developer must
be careful not to misjudge scheduling of the project because construction
duration affects financial costs and, ultimately profitability. Given the high
10OThe table analysed was published in 1992 when interest rates were at 30%, the effect of
financing would be twice as importand today with interest rates over 60%.
29
rates of inflation in Venezuela, a small delay in completion date could result
in substantial additional cost.
In the following chapters, will try to analyze the different financing
schemes used in Venezuela today, and the possibility of alternative
approaches to lower interest rates for developers, to make housing more
affordable from the point of view of the purchaser, and to make these projects
more attractive to developers and less risky to lenders, are discussed.
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STRUCTURE OF REAL ESTATE
INDUSTRY IN VENEZUELA
Today, the Real Estate activity in Venezuela is mostly developmental.
In essence, it is the management and the combination of activities and
functions, which seeks to; "Contribute to the economical and social
development of the nation by the creation of the basic infrastructure needed
for all the activities of the population" .11
Graph 10.
Investment
%s -1
::. Real Estate:: 
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
Financing
Design and
Projects
Construction
Promotions
& Sales
11 El sector Inmobiliario de la Decada de los 90, Camara Inmobiliaria de Venezuela.
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In order to achieve this goal, the real estate activity is highly influenced
by the knowledge of the market, and the constant definition of opportunities
and necessities. Managing a whole range of activities as design, construction,
promotion, financing and administration of projects oriented to the
residential market as well as commercial, services, industrial, tourism and
others. (see Graph 10.) Historically, its expansion permitted growth in the
nation's employment, increase in economic activities, and over time the
wealth of the country..
Today, real estate activity in Venezuela generates close to a
quarter (25%) of the total salaries and earnings of the non-oil sector of the
economy. In general, real estate provides more than 500,000 jobs which is
8.5% of the jobs available in the country, as compared to the agricultural
sector (4.6%)12; further, it generates more than half of total industrial
employment (15.8%). In 1991, real estate activity generated more than 456
thousand million bolivares, 88% of this was generated by construction and
real estate sales while 12%o was generated by other services. In the last two
years, the real estate sector has been growing at a rate of 33.5% which is
notably higher than the growth rate experienced in other industries at only
8.6%.
The production and marketing activities in the construction sector
have the following particular characteristics:
High durability, the decisions which influence over the real estate
demand involve some long term income and expenses flows. There
1 2Camara Inmobiliaria dr Venezuela, 1992.
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has to be a detail analysis about some determinants and strategic
decisions which play an important role, depending upon the different
income sector.
* Long production cycle and turn-over, which makes it highly
sensitive to availability and financing costs. Because of the prolong
period of the turn over of capital in the construction sector, not only
time periods implied on construction, but also the market period of the
product, makes financing a determinant variable for the economic
feasibility of this activity.
* It is a non transient good, which means that limitation for disposability
because of domestic supply cannot be resolved with imports which
make supply of these goods less elastic, in comparison with import
competing industries.
* Incremental stock, the total supply of housing, is made up of new
constructions plus accumulated stock of existing housing, which
generates in conjunction with the primary market, a secondary market
of considerable magnitudes.
In relation with demand aspects, housing acquisition is influenced by
its double condition of having use for consumption which, it is therefore
driven by prices and by population income, and as an investment alternative
(real estate) it is driven by determinants of wealth, returns and future market
expectations. In the same manner, as the stock exchange and the currency
exchange market, the real estate market is typically a speculative market.
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Being that housing it is a component of the alternative method of keeping
wealth in inflationary economic environments, since in an inflationary
period, generally real assets appreciate in value faster than the interest rates.
This is why, determinants of housing demand should consist of not only the
traditional variables of consumption, but also on elements of expected return
from other alternative investments.
The biggest problem confronted in reactivating the Venezuela's
construction sector; is the inflationary environment which has extensively
increased costs, eroded purchasing power of the population and, discouraged
investment. The accumulated inflation for the years 1988 to 1991 was
approximately 189% and has continued to increase in double digits in the past
year. The increase in the price of raw materials for construction for the same
period was 172%. Even though, this seems beneficial for the industry
because it is lower than general inflation, the rate nevertheless is prohibitally
high. Other non-financing costs which involve labor, land and
construction equipment which have increased at a higher pace, in addition,
with a considerable increasing of financing costs for short-term mortgages has
taken the inflation in the properties and housing prices to levels some times
higher than general inflation. (see Graph 12) At the same time, family
income decreased close to 55%, (see Graph 11) and the tendency of
increasing interest rates of long-term mortgages for home acquisitions, have
affected the purchase capacity of the population. In consequence, the
combination of these factors significantly lowered the demand for low-
income housing and the real estate market, and added to the housing deficit
in the country.
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(Camara de la Construccion de Venezuela)
The attractiveness of the construction business in Venezuela and
revenues in the housing market depend on the market segment, defined by
quality and the price of the product being offered. In the case of luxury
housing, quality and location are priority factors, it does not rely on massive
production but does require sufficient profit margins in order to be an
attractive investment. Further, this segment has the capability to buy cash-
down, and does not rely on financing or government subsidy. However it
represents only 5% of the total housing market.
On the other hand, housing construction for lower income sectors,
requires investment oriented towards production. The greater percentage of
this segment is government subsidies by La Ley Politica Habitacional, which
sets the maximum housing price to be build under the law's assistance. The
attractiveness of this market for investment relies on the differential in
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interest rates received by the developer through a mortgage of the housing
law, in comparison to nominal interest rates offered in the market.
However, The demand for this type of housing depends on the availability of
credits offered by the government, which actually determinate the total
housing to be developed. Economies of scale are taken advantage of in order
to attend to significant volumes of demand with possibilities for the
industrialization of parts for housing, to optimize the investment, and to
achieve reduction in costs without lowering the quality and benefits of future
households.
The extent to which inflation is adversely affecting the construction in
Venezuela can be seen in an article published by the daily newspaper "El
Universal" on October 31,1993.
"There is an air of uncertainty regarding the direction that construction in
Venezuela is going to take because of crippling inflation, high interest rates, the fiscal
deficit and unrestricted conditions that govern public work contracts. That explains
why construction companies see their profit margins shrinking at the same time that
there is an inevitable loss of capital resulting in higher costs.
Demand in the industry has been seriously neglected; important works of
infrastructure, services, city planning and housing are pending, and they require proper
technical and economic planning in order to be completed. What's missing is adequate
funding, coming as much from the public sector as the private.
According to the ex-president of the CVC, at the close of 1993 the economic
crisis confronting the country will translate into growth in the GNP of no more than 1%,
an inflation rate of more than 40%, a fiscal deficit of approximately 250,000 million
bolivares, a 35% devaluation of the bolivar and lastly, a depressed price for our
principal export product: petroleum. 1 3
13 Complete article attached as Appendix 1. El Universal. Maribel Torres Pinto.
Oct 31,1993
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After looking at all these facts, we come to realize that financing terms
and interest rates can make or break a development project. Some terms and
rates are fine-tuned to insure the success of a project, while others are harsh
enough to ruin an otherwise promising project. The crucial differences in
terms and rates stem from the ability of the developer to apply up-to-date
innovative and creative financing techniques to the project. While this is
true for any construction, is particularly important for Venezuela because it's
current situation. It seems that for the near future the low interest, fixed rate,
long-term mortgage are almost gone. A number of new more complex
financing plans have arisen in its place. The number and types of financing
plans available now is large and is limited only by the imagination of the
lenders and borrowers and a country's legislation. Some typical examples of
current financing plans implemented in Venezuela are presented in the
following sections.
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PRE-SALES
In analyzing the situation that Venezuela is confronting and the
economic factors driving the development of the housing market, this study
found developers are looking for new and creative financing tools that
provide them with capital at lower interest rates than current active rates and,
at the same time, increases their ability to sell their finished project profitably.
For the last five years, pre-sales has been the method most implemented by
developers when seeking external financing for luxury and middle-class
housing. By analyzing the total pre-sales market in Caracas, we find that 75
residential projects located in 10 of the best neighborhoods comprise 65.3% of
the total pre-sale projects and 56.6% of the total area offered for pre-sale.
In 1993, rising interest rates in the financial market substantially
increased the benefits derived from using pre-sales as a financial instrument
for developers. Because the pre-sales market became very large and
developed such a stable volume of offers which tended to appreciate, people
began to view pre-sales as an investment vehicle.
In a market driven by other factors than demand, pre-sales not only
minimize the risks of developers by giving them the financial leverage of
having funds at no cost, but also progressively insure their ability to sell
property in a market under conditions more advantageous than the ones
implied through a cash transaction. If developers cannot sell their projects
when completed, the interest rate paid on financing will substantially
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decrease calculated returns. Currency devaluation and prolongation of the
period before a return is realized on an investment are major risks taken by
developers. This has made pre-sales, over time, a more important aspect of
real estate activity and, from the developers vantage, eliminated the need for
any other type of financing.
In December 1992, it was estimated that 1993 pre-sales would account
for close to 120,000 sqm.l4 By April 1993 this estimate was changed to 200,000
sqm. (see Graph 14) and it was estimated that the total area offered would be
absorbed by the market within a few months. More over these estimates are
based on pre-sales offered in the market plus projects under design face.
Graph 14. (Camara Inmobiliaria de Venezuela).
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In the pre-sales market, appreciation is attributable to a number of
factors. One, the ability to maintain an attractive market price positively
influences acquisition of property, since the price can be contracted at a
favorable rate and fixed at the time of purchase. Payments to the builder can
be made over time during the construction period, according to the speed and
progress of the construction.
Nevertheless, the purchase price of the property is still directly related
to interest rates. The interest rates to be paid can be included in the amount
of the fractional payments that the buyer has to make by increasing payment
according to interest owed and calculated from the non-paid part of the fixed
price. This method gives the buyer the opportunity to pay accordingly to its
benefit under certain parameters, but he will have to paid passive interest
rates to developers. Another method often employed is an agreement upon a
fixed price which includes the implicit cost of the interest rate in the price and
a pre-arrangement for fixed-time payments. Projects driven by low demand
and mostly oriented toward the middle-class market use pre-sales agreements
containing stipulations regarding only inflation, which means they set the
price to be paid during the construction period. Different payments are
indexed according to the inflation registered for the specific period from date
of purchase (this method usually requires quarterly based payments). As a
result, in theory, the price is fixed as a cash operation and based on current
market conditions, but the buyer assumes all risk resulting from inflation
during the construction period.
Rise of interest rates implies an increase in price in the pre-sale
operation. Although this system continues to be clearly more advantageous
for the buyer when the property appreciates at a higher rate than actual
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interest paid, the pre-sale system is also advantageous because the interest rate
paid is lower than the interest rates the buyer would pay for a mortgage loan,
or other alternative financing. Also, the transaction will be advantageous for
the buyer in proportion to any increase in the price of the property that
exceeds present value of the return on alternative investments.
The evolution of prices in the pre-sales market does not only depend
on the above-mentioned factors. Rather, behavior of supply and demand in
the market is another factor that drives the range of the final property price.
In the same way, family income and expectation of inflation-driven market
appreciation, highly influences price levels.
On the other hand, the financial needs of the developer are important
factors which influence pre-sales prices, and determine whether the
transaction will be attractive to the buyer. Another factor which should be
taken into consideration in the reevaluation of the investment is the actual
advancement in the construction of the project. As the project comes to
completion the risk (delays and quality of construction) for the buyer
decreases and the financial needs of the developer decreases, therefore the
prices increase.
Looking at the movements in Venezuela's pre-sales market between
January and April 1993 the increment in price fluctuations were: 31% of real
estate projects showed a price increase of up to 10%; 33% had an increase of
between 11.0% to 20%; 19,% of the projects increased between 21% and 30%;
and the other 17% suffered increases of over 30%. (see Graph 15.)15 It is
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important to note that a 10% increase in rates during the period from January
to April equals an annual average of 33%. In this sense, and taking into
consideration the accumulated inflation rates of 11% during these four
months, the properties which suffered an appreciation in price in excess of
11% (69% of the properties) benefited the buyers. Similar analysis can be
done by comparing the increase in price levels of pre-sales with currency
exchange depreciation; during this time period, the exchange rate (Bs./$)
incremented by 12%. This shows the advantage of investing in real estate in
Venezuela, or the benefit of buying on pre-sales market than investing in
dollars and then purchasing an apartment cash-down.
Graph 15. (Organizacion AKROS, 1993)
Increase in Price, January -April 1993 Pre-sales Apartments in
Caracas
or Ifol
o33.70 -
30.0%-
25.0%-
20.0% -
15.0%-
a 10.0%.
V 5.0%-
0.0%.
Lower
than
11%
% of Variation in Price
/
43
11% to
20%
lii .....i!i iil
21% to
30%
Higher
than
30%
L
sia
.
..............
11%11141Ulltllif
. ........... . ...... .= a _v
I
lilillti$lill ii
Comparison of price adjustments in the pre-sales market also appears
to be favorable when compared with the registered levels of passive rates
(as a risk-free alternative). During the first quarter of 1993, these rates
fluctuated between 45% and 47% on an annual basis, or almost 14% per
quarter. In this sense, projects that registered a price increase equivalent or
higher than 14% for this period resulted in a favorable difference in pre-sales
operations versus investing in CD's.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that what seems favorable to
-home buyers, may not be as favorable to developers when comparing
appreciation in property prices with current interest rates for construction
funding. If developers would like to take advantage of appreciation in
property prices, they could intermittently sell a specified number of units
:incrementally at the pace of construction to cover costs. This is beneficial for
developers because, in conjunction with non financing through financial
entities the developer assures the selling of the property, and seeks
appreciation in the price trough holding the property for longer periods of
time in order to increase returns.
Finally, the tendency toward increasing prices in the pre-sales
apartment market reflects the cost pressures and demands of prices today in
Venezuela and those expected in the future market. Given these
considerations, the relationship of pre-sales prices and the dynamics of a cash-
down market is extremely narrow. Nevertheless, the increasing prices in
the pre-sales market speculates this presumption, which finally is the "bet"
posted by developers in the Venezuelan market.
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GRADUATED PAYMENT MORTGAGE
After experiencing a considerable increase in interest rates in 1989,
long-term mortgage lending was seriously affected because monthly
amortization payments of credit resulting from higher interest rates made it
impossible for most to finance new housing. These high interest rates
overwhelmed the salary of many middle income families, which is the
market targeted for this type of financing because they do not have enough
resources to make use of a pre-sales format. If the financial system had not
been changed, middle-income families would not have been able to own a
home.
To help middle-class borrowers qualify for a home loan that they
otherwise would not be able to afford, the Savings & Loans developed a
mechanism to restructure the mortgage payment schedule by beginning with
low payments which increased over time. 16 This mechanism allowed banks
to adjust monthly interest payments according to the borrower's individual
salary, and enabled an average families to borrow a sufficient amount of
money to pre-own a home with the philosophy of buy today and pay
tomorrow.
16 This mechanism is based on the mortgage lending system used in Mexico in the last
years, also implemented in the U.S. in the early 80s during high inflation but the
payment levels where graduating according to inflation instead of salary increase.
(Modigliany and lessard, 1975, New Mortgage Design for Stable Housing in an
Inflationary Environment. Further discused in interviews.)
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Monthly graduated mortgage payments vary from year to year.
Based on the fact that in Venezuela salaries do not grow at the same pace as
inflation, monthly payments will not exceed 30% of the family's monthly
income.(Graph 16) More over, the mortgage is molded in such a way so that
should there be a change in interest rates, the effect on the payment would
hardly be felt by the borrower. Specifically, the effect of inflation on the
change in interest rates is slowly absorbed by the monthly payments, allowing
for slow adjustment of rates by the lender according to changing conditions.
An example of this approach is: if a borrower has monthly payments of
100,000 Bs, the bank will give the borrower a discount and, therefore, the
borrower will only pay 50,000 Bs. monthly. This means that the bank is really
giving two loans, one for capital and the other on interest not paid. After 12
monthly payments, the borrower will again have to make one lump sum
payment equal to 4 monthly payments. In the second year, the borrower will
pay 80,000 Bs. Instead of growing with inflation, the monthly payments will
grow with salary, but because of high interest rates the borrower will try to pay
as much as possible in a shorter period of time. 17
17 Interview, Marketing Director, Banco Mercantil, Venezuela 1993.
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Graph 16.
The graduated payment mortgage (GPM) with its rising schedule of
payments is viewed as appropriate only for young families with expectations
of wage growth substantially in excess of the rate of inflation. As seen in
graph 16, the borrower would need to have sustainable earnings for a
prolonged period of time in order to repay the mortgage loan. Some of the
shortcomings of this mechanism are that if the borrower's salary should grow
at a pace slower than inflation and interest rates, the principal of the loan will
increase for several years, although the rising payments would eventually
exceed the interest charges and the borrower would supposedly fully amortize
the principal by the end of the contracted period. If growth of salary in
contrast to inflation is too low, a middle-class borrower could be converted
into a debtor forever. Such a person could confront virtually an everlasting
debt, subject to eventual interest rates.
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In contrast, by pre-buying the property, the borrower is protected from
upwardly spiraling inflation and increasing prices. Still, this system does not
protect the borrower from high interest rates; rather it, merely minimizes its
impact in the immediate future.
One feasible modification of this type of mortgage might be to finance
the pre-sale operation through shared payments. For example: for a
10,000,000 Bs. apartment, the client is expected to pay 2,000,000 initially and
thereafter make quarterly payments of 1,000,000 Bs. In this case, the bank
could finance a percentage of the purchase through a special loan
agreement, 18 in which the bank will provide funds to the buyer according to
the payments that the buyer will make to the developer.
The interest rate for this kind of mortgage would be the actual active
rates and it would have the same type of payment agreement as a graduated
payment mortgage. If we analyze this seemingly simple idea more fully, it
becomes apparent that the buyer would be able to save the differential
between active and passive interest rates, for the price percentage paid by him,
and also will save because the buyer will be able to borrow as needed for the
payments. As previously stated, payments to the bank would be the same as
those used by the graduated mortgage method but the timing of the lending
period would be different and the payments would be lower. On the other
hand, payments to the developer would increase after the price is agreed
upon only at the rate of inflation. 19 As a result the buyer is partly protected
against inflation by using the pre-sales system, but also has lowered exposure
18 Interview, Marketing Director, Banco Mercantil, Venezuela, 1993.
19 Refers to pre-sales agreement conditions.
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to high interest rates through a package combining loans with developers and
lending institutions. The buyer then co-finances the purchase with the
developer during the construction period at the lowest market interest rate
available, and finances these payments to the developer through this new
type of mortgage package by signing an agreement of progressive lending.
The problem with this financing mechanism is that the buyer needs to have
enough money to cover his percentage of the pre-sales agreement and the
monthly mortgage payment.
The Graduated Payment Mortgage is a cleaver financial tool created by
savings and loans institutions to enter the real estate market, this method
seems to be the only feasible path to fulfill the needs of middle-income
families to purchase property by paying low initial installments, while at the
same time the financial institutions are taken advantage of charging the high
interest rates currently offered in the market. This new system has helped
reactivate the middle-income housing sector of the construction industry.
For the industry it is vital that the middle class be able to have access to a
mortgage lending system. Today, the majority of sales in real estate are paid
by either cash-in-full or pre-sales. As a result, this method of lending has
increased sales and expanded the market.
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"Casarapa "
The first housing bond
issued in Venezuela
This chapter analyzes the first bond issued in Venezuela which relied
upon real estate to act as an asset, in addition to interest paid to the
bondholders. It is important to note that this is the first case of such an
issuance. Normally, a bond that had used property as collateral would, on its
expiration date, function like any other fixed income instrument.2 0
Promotora Casarapa C.A. was founded in September 1991 with the
objective of the development of the Urbanizacion Ciudad Casarapa that
constitutes 110.65 hectares for a housing project which would allow for five
thousand (5,000) homes for low- and middle-income families. Each
apartment, which would be approximately seventy three square meters,
constitutes a portion of Ley de Politica Habitacional (LPH) market. The
project will comprise construction of 304,610 square meters of urban
infrastructure and will include educational, recreational and medical service
areas, which will total an approximate investment of seven thousand million
Bolivares (7,000,000,000.00 Bs.).
20 Interview, President Promotora Casarapa C.A., Venezuela, 1993.
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Incentives for Being a Low-income Housing Project:
Previously Promotora Casarapa had issued a long-term financing
based on a mortgage given by Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda (INAVI), on
October 18, 1991. This mortgage consisted of 85%o of the purchase of 110.65
hectares of land which implied 137,286,900 Bolivares. The interest paid for
this mortgage was fixed at 12% annually based on the total cost of land which
represented 161,514,000 Bolivares. The mortgage was to be paid as homes
were sold within a five-year maximum time period. This financing used the
land as collateral. But INAVI committed itself to resigning from the first
degree collateral to the bondholders which would have been used to finance
the housing construction.
Urbanizacion Ciudad Casarapa is a multifamily housing project built
for low- and middle- income families covered by La Ley Politica Habitacional;
which means that the cost of each unit cannot exceed the equivalent of 180
times the standard minimum-wage . The present minimum salary in
Venezuela is Bs. 9,000 which means that the maximum housing price would
be Bs. 1,620,000.00. Any Developer who builds under this law has the
following incentives: Government's credit at 7% (specifically this project)
interest rate for construction through Saving & Loan Entities for a duration of
no longer than three (3) years. Also, this loan automatically transforms into
a mortgage to finance the home buyer at the same rate. The effect of these
incentives on the economic result of the projects are critical in determining
the benefits for the company and its project. Not only because it guarantee's
the market for the project by giving the home-buyer a long-term mortgage at
preferential interest rates., but also because it provides the builder with a
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credit cost of 7% interest rate during construction lowering the financial cost
of the execution of the project. 21
the Beginnings of Housing Bonds:
Basically, the idea of issuing housing bonds resulted from bureaucratic
inefficiencies in implementing the Housing Policy (LPH) for projects of this
size. For instance, if the promoter has the capacity to produce 800 homes per
year, he would require a credit of approximately eight hundred million
bolivares a year through the housing law. Taking into consideration the
existing housing law, the government is able to collect 8 to 10 thousand
million bolivares per year, this would require the government to give
Promotora Casarapa 10% of all resources it collected each year, which is
impossible. Another reason for this issuance was to increase the project's
market potential by giving a reasonable solution to purchase a house for
people who could not receive a loan under La Ley de Politica Habitacional.
After reviewing other financial schemes available, Promotora Casarapa
realized the necessity to develop new financial techniques to guaranty their
project's success.
In the beginning, the idea was that the housing bonds would be
exchangeable for an apartment at the end of the holding period without any
additional interest payments, but this would not have been an appealing
instrument for the investors. According to this new design, the bonds are
21 Refers to chapter 2, Ley de Politica Habitacional.
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instruments that can be sold through the Caracas stock exchange and thus,
they represent a major advantage for the investor and substantially
differentiate this instrument from a pre-sale contract which generally is non-
transferable. The main characteristics of housing bonds are their obligation
to the bearer with a mortgage guarantee. The price of each bond is one
million six hundred and twenty thousand bolivares. What is interesting
about using this instrument is that each bond corresponds to one house,
therefore, at the end of the term, after a maximum of two years, the
bondholder may exchange the bond for a Ciudad Casarapa apartment.
Whoever buys a bond is not only guaranteed for a set price, but also will
receive interest.
Characteristics of the Housing Bonds:
The bonds were issued in Caracas on July 20, 1993. The interest on
them will be paid quarterly with variable interest rates set each quarter; the
bonds will expire 24 months after issuance. The nominal value of each bond
is 1,620,000 Bolivares, there are 154 bonds giving a total nominal value to this
issuance of Bs. 249,480,000. The issuance of the bonds is guaranteed by
Promotora Casarapa, C.A. with part of the land estimated at approximately Bs.
374,220,000 with an area of 1,106,500 sqm. as collateral. The land plus the
infrastructure and all additional building construction on the site remains
under the name of all the bondholders. Should there be a failure or set back
in the mortgaging, a common representative will oversee completion of the
project. Should the developer fail to pay interest on the bonds upon
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maturity or make any modification to the project, the bondholder has the
right to call an assembly to redress the situation. In other words, the risks
faced by the investor in using this type of financial instrument poses no
problem than that confronted by any other commercial operation, i.e. failure.
For this issuance, the interest rates vary and are to be paid quarterly.
The interest rate shall be revised each quarter and will equal an arithmetical
average for the previous four weeks of the posted date which will consist of
80% (eighty percent) of the average rate paid for 90 day CDs by six of the main
commercial banks in Venezuela. The bonds shall be paid in full by the end
of the two year period by giving the bondholder two options:
A. The bondholder will receive the nominal value of the bond plus
10.5% of its nominal value .
B. The bondholder will receive in return for the bond an
apartment with an area of approximately 73 square meters. The
apartment shall consist of three bedrooms, 2 bathrooms, a
kitchen and a laundry. The act of buying the apartment will be
completed at a price of one million six hundred and twenty
thousand bolivares. (Bs. 1,620,000)
In the case that the developer would not be able to exchange the
property, it would correspond to cancellation of the obligation to a
bondholder who selected option B. Then, the bondholder will have the
option to extend the period of the bond for two more quarters with an interest
rate equal to 95% of the average rate paid for 90 day CD's, by the six main
commercial banks in Venezuela. Once this period is terminated, if the issuer
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still finds himself incapable of giving the real estate property to the
bondholder, he will be obligated to pay the nominal value of the bond, plus a
prime of 30% of the nominal value of it.22
Distribution of Funds Raised from Bond Sales:
The funds from this issuance were used to finance the construction of
154 housing units, which compressed the first stage of the Urbanizacion
Ciudad Casarapa project. The funds were distributed in the following:
· earth movement
* road service
* sewer system
* drainage system
* lighting
* building construction
Bs.
Bs.
Bs.
Bs.
Bs.
Bs.
40,000,000.00
30,000,000.00
20,000,000.00
20,000,000.00
30,000,000.00
109,480,000.00
Total Bs. 249,480,000.00
22 Interview, President, Promotora Casarapa C.A., Venezuela, 1993.
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Advantages to Bondholders:
First, bondholders are assured of liquidity because it is an instrument
trade on the Caracas stock exchange which could be sold at any time and at a
higher price. It also provides more security and transparency as a publicly
held operation, than a standard pre-sale contract. The developer, through
this type of issuance offers a collateral and resource management which is
supervised by different Government official agencies.
The second advantage, derives from combining the returns of a real
estate investment with the returns of a financial investment. According to
calculations, if the Venezuela's minimum wage increases to 50 thousand
bolivares in two years, the value of the homes will be 2 million 7 thousand
bolivares at the end of the two-year term. This will mean 66% in additional
earnings on the selling price. According to this, the benefit of buying the
bond lies in the possibility of purchasing the home at the current fixed-price.
If the buyer can afford to do so. This investment will produce a return of
approximately 66% based only on its revaluation as a real estate asset. In
addition, the bond will have quarterly installments based on 80% of the
passive rate for 90-day deposits paid by the six main Venezuelan banks for the
same period. By investing in this manner, the buyer has secured a large
portion of passive-market interest rates, and has purchased a house at current
LPH price, whereas future price fluctuations would depend on nationally set
standard minimum-wage.
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Targeted Clients for the Housing Bond:
The bonds were issued with the idea that they would be acquired by
individual investors interested in buying a home. Another type of client
could be one interested in investing for returns. However, when issued,
Promotora Casarapa found that potential homeowners required additional
financing in order to be able to purchase a home. This was not their objective.
Therefore, they tried to effect a solution in conjunction with Sociedad
Financiera Principal in an effort to improve their offer of apartments at a
fixed price with fixed interest rates of 20% including a guaranteed housing
bond.
Nevertheless, the bond was directed toward the commercial banks and
loan institutions as well as any other company which had a housing program
for its employees. A good example is the Banco Principal which is utilizing
this bond to offer its personnel a housing program at a rate of 20% annually;
but, the bank profits from the subsidiary cost of the bond's interest. This is
profitable for Banco Principal because it obtains a profit of 48% (at today's
rate) from the property's title, in addition to the 20% paid by its employees.
Therefore, the company is able to help its personnel own homes at an
affordable rate, while it still receives market rates for its loans. The actual
distribution of homeowners in Urbanizacion Casarapa is shown in Graph 17.
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Advantages and Disadvantages to Developers:
From the developer's perspective this type of bond issuance has, as one
of its advantages as long as it is in the hands of the final buyers, the fact that
bonds can be converted into sales instruments and expand the commercial
network which indirectly acts as sales representatives of the developers firm.
if the bondholders will be the future homeowner, this implies that the
transaction was completed on a cash-down basis. This obviates the need to
obtain credits set by the Housing law, which today is extremely difficult and
cumbersome.
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Another important advantage of this new bond instrument is that
developers will also maintain independence, management, and
administrative control which would be difficult to preserve if they were to
rely on bank financing. The developers also have the guarantee and
disposability of these resources whenever needed, independent of eventual
fluctuations of bank liquidity because of changes in interest rates.
On the other hand, developers take the risk of freezing the prices of the
apartments and of finding themselves with units sold two years prior, which
have re-appreciated more than originally expected. Another disadvantage is
due to the inflation risk that could exceed the estimated revenues, if they
were not covered by the financial differential of the operation. Today's cost
of one apartment to the public is 1,620,000 Bs. and today's cost for Promotora
Casarapa is approximately 1,450,000 Bs. Previous experience indicate that, at
the end of next year when the units are finished, house construction costs
will probably appreciate to 1,620,000 Bs. When we realize this effect of
inflation on real cost, then earnings must come from how the funds has been
utilized during the two-year construction time period (future value of
money). Thus, real earnings come from the differential of raising money at
80% of passive bank rates, which is approximately 48% at today's rate. Also, if
we take into consideration that active rates are, on average at 70%, that
developer can obtained additional benefit by investing these resources at
market rates. This additional income should compensate for the cost
increases caused by inflation and suffered by the developer during the
construction period against current sales prices at which the bonds were
issued.
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In the projected cash flow for Urbanizacion Casarapa (Table 2.), we can
foresee that the total income increase at the beginning of each transaction (as
housing bonds, pre-sales or loans by LPH) and decreases over time when the
money is utilized for construction. The Additional Income for Investments
row shows the magnitude of the earnings calculated by the developer from
investing the capital raised at the interest rates offered in the market. From
this we can conclude that, in today's market, low-income housing is a
business more directed toward financial investment and money handling
rather than merely construction.
Total Financial Cost for Urbanizacion Casarapa:
In analyzing the total financial cost of Casarapa, we can see that the
average interest rate paid by Promotora Casarapa C.A. is very low, at only 30%
of the active rates offered in Venezuela (under the condition of a fixed price
given by the Ley de Politica Habitacional ). The total money in loans in a
mortgage basket, consists of 400,000,000 Bs. at 7% by LPH; 300,000,000 Bs. in
pre-sales at zero-cost. This represents approximately 65% of the mortgage
basket at approximately 4% annually. The other two resources utilized by
this developer are a commercial bank mortgage providing rotatory cash and
bridge credits which, although in constant change, usually represent
approximately 20% of the mortgage basket, of Bs. 100,000,000 at an actual rate
of 70%, and 250,000,000 Bs of the sale of housing bonds at an actual rate of
48%. By combining this basket of loans, the financing cost calculated from
the different financing schemes implemented by Promotora Casarapa results
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in an annual average of 21.24%, compared to 70% active rates in the market,
and to a 50% inflation rate, which means that Promotora Casarapa has
subsided its project by more than 28% over inflation.
The short- and long-term potential growth of implementing this
mechanism depends on how this negotiation is received by the public and the
market. Thus it is a test case, providing new alternative to financing, and if it
is successful and the public becomes familiar with this type of issuance and
starts to purchase, it will be of great importance to developers since they will
not be totally dependent upon financial institutions in the future. And, this
will also be the beginning of a secondary market for real estate in Venezuela.
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REAL ESTATE FINANCING
IN U.S. DOLLARS
This chapter discusses the creation of a mechanism which would allow
developers to finance projects in Venezuela and pay interest in dollars rather
than in bolivares at a higher rate. By doing so, this chapter raises key
questions as to how developers in Venezuela are creating defensive-based
economic approaches by offering financial tools which may seem to be more
secure to investors. It is important to note that this instrument has never
been used in Venezuela. Rather, the numbers estimated are market-based
and derive from proposals discussed during interviews with developers and
private investors. This particular analysis focuses on a middle-income
family development project in Caracas. This project will include one
hundred and forty apartments of approximately eighty-four square meters,
comprised of a: living room, dining room, kitchen, three bedrooms, and two
bathrooms, .23
The instrument under discussion consists of a bond which will operate
in a manner very similar to the housing bond issued by Promotora Casarapa
(see Chapter 8). These bonds are instruments that can be sold through the
Caracas stock exchange and thus represent a major advantage for the investor.
Each bond corresponds to one apartment and the nominal value is equal to
23Interview, Roberto La Rocca, Developer, Venezuela, 1993
63
Bs. 12,957,615. There are 140 bonds for a total issuance of 1,814,066,000 Bs.
To increase the appeal of this issuance, during the holding period, the
bondholder will receive interest in US dollars because dollars are known to be
a very strong and secure currency. At the end of the term, a maximum of 43
months, the bondholder may exchange the bond for an apartment. The land
plus the infrastructure and all additional on-site building construction
remains in the name of all bondholders. Should there be a failure in
mortgaging, a common representative will oversee completion of the project.
Should the developer fail to pay interest on the bonds upon maturity or make
any modification to the project, the bondholder has the right to call an
assembly to redress the situation.
For this issuance, the interest rates are fixed and are to be paid monthly.
The interest rate will equal a fixed rate of US$ 10% annually, based on the
nominal value of the bond in dollars at the exchange rate of the day in which
the operation was executed. The bonds shall be paid in full by the end of the
43 month period by giving the bondholder, in return for the bond, an
apartment in the project. This apartment could be kept by the bondholder or
sold in a secondary market. It is important to note that each of these bonds is
exchangeable for one apartment if annual inflation is no more than 35%.
Any difference over this inflation rate will be paid by the bondholder at the
end of the holding period. Whoever buys a bond is guaranteed a set price,
which would change only if the inflation rate exceeds 35% per annum as
estimated by the developer; in this case, the bondholder must compensate the
developer for the difference over the nominal value of the bond.
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From the Developers perspective:
The idea of this type of instrument is to expand the universe of
possible investors by incrementing the market from 140 possible middle-
income homeowners who would comprise the pre-sales market, to investors
who are looking for instruments which will not fluctuate with currency
devaluation. From the developer's perspective this type of bond issuance
has the advantage that it can be converted into sales instruments and expand
the commercial network. Further, it provides the developer with the
advantage of maintaining independent control of the project which would
otherwise be difficult to preserve if he had to rely on bank financing.
This mechanism does not increase the developer's risks because the
bonds are guaranteed by the apartments which constitute the final payment.
Also the developer is protected from inflation because the bondholder covers
anything over the projected inflation. If the developer had instead,
contracted to repay the bonds in dollars at the end of the operation, the risk
would be tremendous because if there were a devaluation of the bolivar
considerably higher than inflation and simultaneously appreciation of the
property, the developer would not be able to repay the bonds with earnings
from the selling of units.
By analyzing this type of financing in dollars at an annual interest rate
of 10% also in dollars, and by calculating an annual inflation rate in
Venezuela of 40%, we can conclude that the real cost of this financing
mechanism is approximately 50% in bolivares for the developer. This
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means that this mechanism not only enables the developer to sell the
property, but also provides him with a differential in interest rates (active
interest rates in Venezuela are currently at 70%), which could increase the
projected return. In order to minimize the currency risk, the developer could
hedge against the dollar, by making an investment, equivalent to the amount
of the interest to be paid during the project to the bondholders, in dollars.
The difference between the rate paid of 10% and the interest earned on this
small amount e.g. 3% would imply a small loss as financing cost. Given this
method, the developer achieves a hedge against the risks of currency
exchange.
Estimating Dollar-Based Bond Prices:
An important aspect of these bonds for the developer is the price at
which the bonds will be sold. The price of the apartments is calculated by the
developer as if it were a pre-sales operation in which all the units will be sold
within a ten-month period as follows: (see Table 3.) In the first month of pre-
sales (July 1994) approximately 20% of the apartments would be sold at a price
of 138,000 Bs/sqm. The next 7 months of sales would consist of groups, each
representing 10% of the total complex and, finally, 5% of the units during
each of the last two months. Because of inflation, for this calculation,
monthly appreciation was estimated at 3% which is why the developer is
covered for a yearly inflation rate of 35%. The projected payment plan for
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the units is: a down-payment of 25%, monthly payments (during
construction) which will total 60% of the price of the apartment and a final
payment of the remaining 15% at turn-key. This analysis gives a total sales
revenue of 1,814,066,000 Bs. which should equal the total value of the bonds
issued.
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Bond Issuance's in Developing Countries:
Developing countries have a vital interest in international financial
market developments and in the safety and soundness of the international
financial system. These markets offer such countries the possibility of
attracting the funds they need for their development. Two obstacles prevent
fuller utilization of international financial markets by developing countries:
creditworthiness and the standards of investor protection on domestic
financial markets. Lack of creditworthiness impedes new financial flows.
Re--establishment of creditworthiness is essential if the element of country
risk is to be reduced to a minimum. If investors are going to channel funds
through the equity markets of developing countries, they need assurance that
these markets operates efficiently and transparently and that international
standards of investor protection are met.
Increasing global competition in financial markets and worldwide
capital mobility, suggest that developing countries will need to ensure that
their policies foster an attractive financial environment for investors if they
intend to tap these markets. Therefore, it is useful to analyze the interest
rates which will be paid to investors so that they will be attracted to high-risk
investments. Moreover, domestic investors are also affected by an increased
global outlook and investment opportunities abroad. Since financial
liberalization and technological development have made capital movements
easier, including movements of funds out of developing countries, the need
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to raise domestic financial market standards is increasingly important as a
means of discouraging capital flight.2 4
If on a risk adjusted basis, returns are higher domestically than
elsewhere, the integration of domestic capital markets should attract capital
from abroad. Indeed, the global outlook of investors, and the freer
movement of funds offer considerable opportunities to developing countries.
The underlying rate of return on many investment projects in countries such
as Venezuela are high and, if promoters can avoid allowing this return to be
offset by country risks, they will be able to attract the capital the project
requires. Among funds devoted to cross-border investment, there is a margin
for investors to direct a small portion of their portfolio to high-risk, high-
yielding investments, such as those which developing countries might offer.
In particular, interest rates need to be market-determined in order to set
appropriate price signals for both the suppliers and the users of funds.
In addition, the current political situation in Venezuela can be
appealing to investors who can be assured that the rules of the game now
emerging in Venezuela are backed by a wide political consensus. Although
problems existed with former president Carlos Andres Perez, Venezuela still
maintained a stable democracy for more than 35 years, and no organized
subversive movements exist anywhere in the country. The increase
momentum of privatization and liberalization of the economy, further make
Venezuela an attractive place for foreign capital.
24lnternational Monetary Funds. " International Capital Markets". 1990.
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The investment opportunities in dollars are extensively increasing in
the Venezuelan market because the return in dollars by fixed income
investments offered in the country substantially offset the risks perceived by
some investors, specially when they compare this market with similar ones
in Latin America. For example, if we look at Tables 4 & 5 it is apparent that
recent returns offered in Venezuelan bonds have reached similar levels of
returns to those offered by Mexico, Argentina and Brazil. This is important
since these three countries are considered the most stable within the Latin
American hemisphere.
Table 4.
Returns in Latin America
Bonds in Dollars
INSTRUMENT ANNUAL RETURNS DURATION
exico
ynkro 8.00% 360 Days
.M.M. 8.00% 360 Days
Banco 8.00% 360 Days
nternacional
rgentina
oma Negra 8.00% 180 Days
Brazil
anespa 8.30% 180 Days
ercantil 8.30% 180 Days
udamtex 8.30% 180 Days
Interacciones. Oct 1993.
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Table 5.
ETURNS IN VENEZUELA BONDS INDOLLARS
Instrument Expiration Coupon Purchase price Selling price Return
IMA N.V 4-Nov-94 9.257%o 100.25% 101.25%o 8.03%
encemosB 9-Sep-96 10.00% 102.00% 103.00% 8.83%
Sudamtex 14-Jan-97 9.50% 100.25% 100.50% 9.31%
Paveca 2-Feb-97 9.75% 100.50% 100.50%o 9.57%
R.O.V. 11-Sep-96 9.75% 105.25% 105.75% 7.52%
ariven S.A. 25-Feb-97 9.00% 102.12% 102.63% 8.06%
CI 13-Dec-98 0.00% 80.00% 81.00% 8.48%
ariven S.A. 17-Mar-02 10.62% 107.37% 107.88% 9.22%o
TCC 31-Mar-07 4.00%o 60.00% 61.00% 12.55%o
Mercantil International Capital Markets, Oct 1993.
Bond Analysis: Risk vs. Return:
Dollar-based housing bonds were issued with the idea that they would
be acquired by individual investors interested in buying a home, or a client
interested in a dollar-based investment which offered a high-yield.
In order to attract investors to dollar-based projects, interest rates
offered by developers should be comparable to those offered for similar
projects funded in Bolivares. Basically, the risks involved in both types of
investments (dollars or bolivares) are the same except for the fact that
investment in bolivares could devaluate. Further, realistic interest-rate
policies should be employed to attract individuals to invest in real estate.
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Dollar-based housing bonds would pay more than one additional
interest point (in US dollars) than other similar private issues in Venezuela
(see Table 5). This additional interest constitutes a considerable difference
when compared to actual inflation rates in the United States of approximately
3.5% . The difference of risk appreciation between these housing issuance's
and other bonds should be nothing more than the natural reflection of
investing in real estate as opposed to other industries. Depending on an
investor's preference and the type of risk that he/she is willing to take, this
kind of real estate bond could be viewed as an interesting high risk/high-
yield investment.
On the other hand, the differential from investing in bolivares at a
passive-interest rate of 60% annually, in comparison with dollar-based
housing bonds which offer a return of 10% annually in dollars, when
calculated as a bolivares-based investment (at a devaluation rate of 35%)
actually produces a total return of 45% annually. This 15% differential in
Bolivares represents the risk taken by the investor by assuming the
devaluation of the currency. More specifically, to avoid currency risk, the
investor agrees to reduce his profits by 15% (calculated on Bs.), on a real estate
investment. If the project does not assure the value of the investment in
dollars, there is no reason to invest in this instrument which is offering less
than others with equal or lower risks. Looking at Graph 5. (Chapter 1) we
can see that, to attract investment in local currency, financial institutions in
Venezuela paid differential in passive interest rates of over 15% over
inflation when compared to US passive interest rates. Thus, it is very
important to question whether the project truly assures that the money
invested fluctuates in dollars rather than bolivares.
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Using this instrument, the real risk facing the investor is the
devaluation suffered by Venezuela's currency if it is intended as a dollar-
based investment. Further, in this type of issuance's the bondholder has as
collateral property (a middle-income unit in Caracas) for which, even though
the bond is paying interest in dollars, the price of the property remains in
Bolivares.
Comparing the currency devaluation in Venezuela (of the bolivar
against the dollar) with the appreciation of real estate due to inflation
(Graph 18.), we can observe that for the last 3 years it would have been
beneficial for the foreign investor to invest in housing (using the dollar-based
housing bonds). The investor not only would have received 10% interest in
dollars, but also the properties would have appreciated during 1991 and 1992
in higher levels than the currency devaluation, thus increasing the property
values in dollars, which brings higher returns on the investment. During
'1990 and 1993 the property's appreciation were equivalent to the devaluation,
which means that the investor realized his 10% interest on investment. Any
differential between property appreciation and currency exchange rate will
indicate an appreciation of the property in dollars. On the other hand, any
differential between devaluation and property appreciation will result in
losses for the investor.
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Graph 18. (C.V.C.A.R)
Although, it appears to be a good investment because in the last three
years appreciation of property has been either higher or equal than currency
devaluation, this does not assure the future behavior of the market. The
investor would be betting on the devaluation of the bolivar against property
appreciation, because the price of the property will always be calculated in
bolivares. This means that if the Bolivar suffers a devaluation beyond that
initially estimated, the developer will probably be able to pay the interest
owed, but the nominal value of the bond still is equivalent to an apartment
whose price fluctuates in Bolivares. Hence, the actual value of the property
has nothing to do with an investment in dollars. But rather, will depreciate
as the Bolivar devaluates.
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Devaluation of Bs. vs. Property Appreciation
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Graph 18. (C.V.C.A.R)
Instead, the fluctuation in price of a middle-income housing project in
Venezuela is determined primarily by such market parameters as supply and
demand and levels of middle-class income, both of which bear no relation to
the dollar. Inflation, which is an extremely influential parameter in the
price of Venezuelan real estate, has fluctuated in the last year in direct
relation to currency exchange rates, but this does not mean that in the future
it will continue to do so, or that the price of property will be directly related to
the dollar, or property prices will increase with inflation as the currency
devaluates. Given these considerations this means that the investor
ultimately has achieved no special security for investing in dollars and is
actually being underpaid for the risks taken. For these reasons, I do not
believe that a dollar-based investment is a viable alternative. Even if the
developer repays the bonds in cash and only uses units under construction as
collateral, this is not sufficient to assure the investment against currency
devaluation.
After reviewing this mechanism which is currently under
consideration in Venezuela, we can more fully appreciate how promoters as
well as investors are trying to reduce risk by aligning themselves with an
economy in which inflation does not affect fluctuations in prices or market
stability. By proceeding in this fashion, they are trying to by-pass these risks
by basing their investment in a more solid currency. From this we learn that
we should always be aware of what the real parameters are that drive and
affect our investments, and that the return should always be equivalent to the
risks such an investment implies.
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CONCLUSION
Given the condition of hyper-inflation that Venezuela economy is
experimenting, structural imbalances have emerged in real estate. The
housing market has been affected by increases in construction costs, and a
tendency toward increasing interest rates on short- and long-term mortgages
in combination with an erosion in the purchasing power of the population.
Consequently, there has been a decline in purchasing capacity and in demand
in the real estate market. Further, this hyper-inflationary environment has
initiated a demand for higher real rate of returns from investments in real
estate to compensate for additional risks related to fluctuations in
Venezuela's currency. This increase in the real levels of interest rates has
resulted in a transfer of wealth from debtors to creditors. With a market
driven in this manner, large restrictions arise which make it impossible for
developers to function efficiently in actual circumstances.
On the other hand, by realizing that financing terms and interest rates
can make or break a project, we find developers who through new financing
mechanisms are counteracting the effects of this economic environment on
the Venezuelan real estate market. The key needs which developers are
seeking to meet by creating new methods of financing are: Lower amounts of
initial investment, independence from the mortgaging system of financial
institutions, minimizing the costs of raising money, hedging against
inflationary cost increases, and most important leveraging risks involved in
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transactions. In real estate transactions in Venezuela, some of the risks are:
financing, natural risks of construction, price of construction costs,
operational and management, environmental, market, inflation and
currency exchange risks. In either way, in a context of instability and
particularly faced with hyper-inflation, it is too difficult to develop a market
for long-term financing instrument. The horizon of transactions is reduced
in linear relation to an environment of uncertainty which pervades the
economy. This makes financing of construction and housing fundamentally
different in Venezuela than those of economies with a more stable price
structure.
In analyzing real estate market behavior, pre-sales are thus far the
more advantageous financial tool utilized by developers to raise money.
Pre-sales not only minimizes developers risks by giving them the financial
advantage of raising funds at no cost, but also progressively insure their
ability to sell property in an uncertain market. If the developer uses pre-
sales approach to sell a specified number of units incrementally and
intermittently at the pace of construction to cover costs, then he will be able to
protect himself against inflation by taking advantage of the appreciation of his
property. But, when looking at the actual numbers arising from appreciation
of property price, it becomes apparent that comparing appreciation with the
passive interest rates that would be received by the future homeowner, the
appreciation of the apartments is favorable because, in most cases, it is higher
than the rates paid for bank deposits. However, when one compares the
appreciation of real estate with an active interest rate that would have to be
paid by developers to get a mortgage, there is no margin wide enough when
selling appreciated property to compensate for the risk: of having to pay a 70%
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yearly interest rate on a mortgage, of not selling the apartments on time
and/or incurring low appreciation in the real estate market. Thus, the
risk/ return balance remains unfavorable to developers.
As discussed by this paper, when looking at financial alternatives
presently available in Venezuela's real state market, it is apparent that all of
them are actually variations of the pre-sales system. For instance, the
graduate payment mortgage became a financial tool enabling savings and
loans institutions to enter the real estate market by fulfilling the needs of
middle-income families to purchase property while expanding bank activity
in the pre-sales market. Similarly, housing bonds which might initiate a
secondary market in real estate financing in Venezuela, is also a way of
providing low- and middle-income families with an opportunity to become
homeowners. this methodology however, creates a different approach to the
pre-sales market by offering an alternative in which the buyer pays up front
the full purchase price and in return, receives both the property and the
possibility of earned interest while the pre-paid property appreciates during
construction. This mechanism was created with these characteristics,
because of the fixed-set prices due to the housing law. Finally, the dollar-
based housing bond which comes from the idea of the previous housing
bond, calculates its prices based as if where a pre-sales operation.
In this analysis, the intention is to emphasize the contribution of the
real estate sector, not only economically and socially, but also in designing
new economic development policies. Given the determinants for the
demand of real estate in Venezuela which are liquidity, housing price,
mortgage rates, availability of credit and currency exchange rates, in order to
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create an effective path for housing demand it is necessary to consider several
factors:
* Stabilizing housing prices, when looking at actual
market configurations, this only seems possible if costs
of raw materials are stabilized.
* Reducing interest rates and expanding available credits,
while these are highly influenced by general macroeconomic
issues and specific monetary standards, both suppose positive
domestic economic growth and the efficiency of the financial
institutions.
* Stabilizing the value of currency, this might be achieved by
economic growth that provides incremental alternatives to
maintain wealth in domestic financial investments.
* Achieving an environment of political and social stability,
which would make possible the materialization of Venezuela's
economic potential.
* Controlling inflation, by implementing successful monetary
and fiscal policies.
* Making housing policy law adequate relative to the
housing market, so that it is flexible enough to confront
inflation successfully, which must be considered in order to
establish the range of housing prices covered. Also should
consider the incorporation of other mechanisms to raise more
resources.
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* Stimulating new types of investors, such as pension funds and
insurance companies by giving tax advantages implementing
creative financial instruments and new capital markets.
In addition the real estate private sector should:
* Increase its capacity to react to new market conditions, by
incrementing productivity and successful management
strategies.
* Increase creativity in its search for new construction methods,
and reduce its costs without lowering quality, especially
in the low-income housing market.
* Develop new financial plans, which can be adapted to the
market, the population's evolution of purchasing power and
its indebtedness.
These factors are in reality, primarily symptoms of a stable economic
situation which would provide an environment for effective economic
growth for the country as well as for national industries and individuals. By
accomplishing this, investment opportunities in Venezuela would increase,
while the fluctuation in prices would decrease. If implemented, demand
would expand, developers could function more efficiently, and the well being
of the population in regard to housing will substantially increase.
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